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Abstract—Hangzhou subway collapse is the most serious 
subway construction disaster to date in China. In this article, the 
management and regulatory questions the collapse raised are 
focused and a case study of Hangzhou subway collapse is given. 
By regarding the contractual arrangement as an outcome of a 
power game of principal-agent, the social causes and the 
perverse incentives to strategic behaviors of the key players are 
investigated to explain the particular project outcomes. In the 
end, some policy suggestions are given for improving the safety 
performance of subway construction. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
OVEMBER November 15, 2008 at 3:20 pm. A major 
accident occurs at Line 1 of the Hangzhou City Subway 
Network under construction in the Xiaoshan district. A 100 
meter-long and 50 meter-wide section of a tunnel under 
construction collapses. The immediate death-toll is 21, while 
24 persons are found seriously injured, and the direct 
economic loss is about 4961 million Yuan [1]. 
This event traumatized China not long ago and was the most 
serious subway construction disaster to date, which emerges 
in the context of public sector financial stringencies where 
private sector funding and other resources are tapped, leading 
to sometimes highly complex client-contractor relations. This 
tragedy begs the question what factors underlie this serious 
accident in Hangzhou, and what lessons can be drawn from it 
for other projects? More generally, what mechanisms must be 
held responsible for them and what can be done to improve 
their solidity in future occasions?  
Many different types of safety lessons exist, because many 
different factors contribute in essential ways to safety 
performance [2]. Depending on one‟s perspective, safety can 
be viewed as a composite effect of technical factors, 
organizational factors and social factors; latent factors and 
active factors; technical deficiencies and human errors. 
Generally, the latent factors are always hidden in the 
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organization (poor design, gaps in the supervision) and 
difficult to detect, but they are said to have a deep and 
persistent influence on safety performance. Reference [3] 
claims that with the growing complexity of infrastructure 
construction, technology and the social environment in which 
it is embedded have become more intertwined and giving 
clear-cut practical recommendations to fix things has become 
harder and less helpful. Meanwhile, the significance of more 
implicit features of organization and work coordination has 
increased, making it more meaningful to look at safety at 
several levels of abstraction, as for instance Rasmussen and 
Hellstrom have done[4], [5].  
In this article, we will focus primarily on the contractual 
arrangements between the client, normally a public authority, 
and the contractor, often a private firm or consortium of firms 
responsible for the project management. The relationship 
between these two players can be seen as a principal-agent 
relation. In our analysis, we will describe this relationship as 
an active tradeoff of values between two partners in 
accordance with how they see their self-interest, leading to 
particular project outcomes.  
II. TRADING PUBLIC VALUES IN PRINCIPAL AGENT RELATIONS 
Modern contractual arrangements in which construction 
and project management is in multiple hands often take the 
shape of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) or Public-Public 
Partnerships (PUPs). These novel approaches to infrastructure 
delivery are known to have advantages as well as 
disadvantages, the balance between both being either positive 
or negative, depending on a wide range of factors, including 
the eye of the beholder [6]-[9]. Their composite impact is 
complex and one of their more obvious features is that as more 
actors get involved, the existence of multiple and partly 
conflicting values becomes apparent [10]. Public values are 
known to be essential aspects of service delivery in 
infrastructures to which citizens and/or consumers are 
attached, such as mobility, universal access, safety, 
sustainability, efficiency and transparency [11]-[12]. These 
are often defined at a relatively high level of abstraction by 
policy-makers, and at that level they all seem equally crucial 
and essential. However, when it comes to their 
implementation, they turn out to be partly contradictory, 
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making a trading off process among them necessary [13]. 
Reference [8] and Reference[14] show that there is a gap 
between public values as defined in the abstract and public 
values as they are realized in the daily practice of service 
delivery. For instance, in the Australian construction industry, 
all stakeholders perceive worker safety as a vital public value, 
yet it is not highly rated in the assessment criteria, nor does it 
become manifest in the generally poor safety records on the 
work-floor. Reference [8] suggests the gap between „abstract 
value‟ and „practical value‟ is the main reason why other 
public values overshadow safety. In addition, „a culture of cost 
cutting‟ is also an important underlying cause. It seems that in 
practice, cost-reduction is a hard public value protected by 
strong incentives and powerful actors, whereas safety is a soft 
public value the safeguarding of which has much weaker 
supporters and the institutionalization is also less secured. 
Reference [15] state that „hard‟ values are firmly 
institutionalized in formal objectives and performance 
indicators, while „soft‟ ones remain far more elusive and 
intangible when it comes down to it, because they tend to lose 
out in the trading off process towards project implementation. 
To clarify how public values are exactly traded off against 
each other during the implementation process, it is helpful to 
see how abstract values find their way into concrete project 
management benchmarks and are thus enforced. Reference 
[16] argue that the four „classical‟ project management 
benchmarks, time, cost, scope and quality, can be seen as 
concretizations at the lower tactical and operational level of 
construction projects of values imposed upon the project by 
various public and private parties (compare [17]). 
Reference [18] has argued that these values are chiefly 
encouraged by the client, particularly in situations where the 
client controls the initial budget and is most sensitive to 
signals from citizens and customers to uphold public values. 
In theory, the client strives to maximize scope with the highest 
quality for the least money and within the shortest possible 
time, while the constructor has an interest in spending the least 
effort for the highest possible budget and over the longest 
period of time [16]. What does it mean in practice? In practice, 
the public client will be keen to minimize contract uncertainty 
to avoid and deflect possible political blame. This normally 
implies minimizing time and costs and maximizing the scope 
of projects (in terms of what it can do for mobility, 
sustainability etc.) to please fellow politicians, citizens and 
customers and increase the attractiveness of the project to 
gather and sustain support. Officially quality issues as defined 
above are also part and parcel of what public clients should 
uphold, but in practice they know far less about them and they 
are also far less conspicuous before and during construction. 
As a consequence, this protection often remains limited to 
paying lip-service, unless protected by strong and enforceable 
benchmarks. Contractors, on the other hand, are less 
dependent on political support and keep out of the limelight. 
They are more profit-oriented and focus on the minimization 
of time and cost spending. With regard to scope, they 
accommodate the wishes of their client which may fluctuate 
over time due to political pressures, but consider them an 
external obligation or requirement imposed on them. Their 
concern with quality is the least strong, especially there where 
no legal or contractual liability exists for them, because they 
are mostly a cost. Moreover, as general project managers they 
tend not to know enough about them and therefore delegate 
technical details to subcontractors whose concerns equally 
reside with minimizing (their own) time and costs and 
otherwise complying with their contract obligations (with the 
main contractor). Scope and especially quality for them are 
merely side considerations that are (hopefully) accommodated, 
without excitement. 
Situations grow particularly risky when contractors have 
agreed to tight budgets and time schedules with their clients, 
when afterwards these clients keep meddling with the actual 
decision-making and place novel scope demands on the table 
(derived from political pressure or expediency) which the 
contractor has to incorporate in the package without 
(sufficient) compensation. In most cases, expanding „scope‟ 
puts safety at risk, because the constructor, with his back 
against the wall, will keep up his profit levels while cutting 
corners and redressing „quality‟ if he feels he has to do so. 
This can come in various forms such as economizing on 
construction materials, cutting back and/or saving time on 
quality checks or ignoring geological risks. In any of the 
above cases, the safety boundary is shifted to grey areas where 
you may not want to have them. 
To sum up, although the causes of the Hangzhou subway 
collapse can be attributed to technical reasons and the human 
errors, just like the official investigations do [1], the 
underlying conditions can be found in management and 
regulatory sides, such as contractual arrangements and the 
way these play out in the way involved actors (clients, 
contractors, subcontractors) trade off values against each 
other and behave strategically in ways to serve their own 
interest even if this goes to the detriment of certain public 
values (see figure 1). 
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Figure 1 The game of trading off public values 
III. THE CASE OF THE HANGZHOU SUBWAY COLLAPSE 
The Hangzhou subway system was first conceived in 1984 
and is the largest investment with the longest construction 
  
 
period in the history of the city. Eight subway lines are 
projected, with a total length of 278 km, requiring a total 
investment of at least 100 billion Yuan (over 10 billion euros). 
The first phase of the construction will consist of lines 1, 2 and 
part of line 4 and is estimated at approximately 45 billion 
Yuan. Currently, subway line 1 is under construction. It will 
be 47.97 kilometers long, with 30 stations, 41.36 km 
underground, 6.14 km elevated, and 0.47 km at the ground 
level. In 2004, the initial total estimated project costs were of 
15.2 billion Yuan provided by both the city government (10.2 
billion Yuan) and private banks (5 billion), but this number 
has increased to 22.08 billion Yuan since 2007. It was hoped 
that line 1 could become the backbone of the New Hangzhou 
in the urban space structure [19] and was well-known for 
being the longest trajectory of almost 48 km, about three times 
the average length of single lines in China. The Hangzhou city 
government aimed to transfer the Hong Kong pattern of 
subway development (Build-Develop-Operate- Transfer, 
BDOT) to Hangzhou, where subway construction was linked 
to and dependent on real estate development. Consequently, 
real estate developers were attracted to support urban 
expansion. These developers regularly lobbied for changes in 
the route to increase their profits and found a sympathetic ear 
with the city government which realized that such changes 
also generated additional income for the city. 
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June 6, 2002, the Hangzhou Subway Group Co. Ltd was 
founded, a so-called Special Project Vehicle (SPV) with the 
aim to build and operate the metro system, accompanied by a 
remarkable change in policy intents from mitigating traffic 
congestion to supporting urban expansion [20]. A final 
notable fact are the weak geological conditions (soft soil 
layers, high underground water levels and extensive sludgy 
layers) against which experts in charge of the line 1 planning 
review warned in advance. To accommodate this caveat a 
section of the subway about 260 meters long (named Qiutao 
experimental section for 0.17 billion Yuan) was built for 
exploration, testing and learning on December 26, 2003. 
These tests were apparently successful, since the construction 
of subway line 1 was officially approved by the central 
government January 17, 2007. 
As to the financial arrangement, the main constitution of the 
funds for subway line 1 is Hangzhou government and Districts 
governments (55%), Bank loans (23%) and private company 
(10%). Although financial responsibilities are distributed over 
the Hangzhou government, the district governments and the 
banks, actual decision-making power stays firmly in the hands 
of the Hangzhou government, implying that it can intervene 
without impunity at any time and in any decision-making 
phase (planning, building, operations and management). 
On March 20 2007, the Hangzhou Subway Group launched 
an open tender for its construction, which is now divided up in 
no less than 40 contract sections. Here it should be noted that 
two big state-owned enterprises, the China Railway Group Co. 
Ltd. (CRG) and the China Railway Construction Corporation 
Limited (CRCC), together (including their various 
subsidinaries) won about 65% of the bids, while the 22.5% 
private winners are all from Zhejiang province itself. Both 
aspects indicate the high level of market concentration. 
When it comes to the specific contract section of Xianghu 
station where the accident occurred, it appears that the 
selected contractor is China Railway Group Co Ltd (CRG), 
the market leader, at a bidding price of 306.214 million Yuan 
for a scheduled construction time of 706 days. The quality 
requirement in this contract is „pass‟, which is at the lower end 
of a two-level scale „pass-good‟ set by the client (Hangzhou 
Subway Group) for line 1. In reality, choosing market leader 
CRG actually entails hiring a number of fairly unknown and 
interdependent subcontractors doing the job (more details in 
later), because it already has too many construction projects to 
deal with. What you see is not always what you get. 
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE HANGZHOU SUBWAY COLLAPSE 
A. Results from the official investigations 
The Hangzhou City government set up an examination 
immediately after the accident. On February 9, 2010, the 
outcomes of this investigation were released by the Hangzhou 
government [1]. These focused mostly on technical reasons 
and causes, such as the violation of construction rules, 
problems in the support systems for the roof, failures in the 
project monitoring and the problematical effectiveness of the 
rescue operations. The only organizational reason mentioned 
in the report was that the project monitoring company, 
Zhejiang Dahe Engineering Monitoring Co. Ltd. was an 
„attached‟ one, meaning that it was actually a subcontractor 
which was part of the Design Institute of China Railway No 4 
Engineering Group Co. Ltd, but in a different guise. This 
implies that the monitoring organization is effectively the 
same as the actual constructor. 
B. Continuous revisions in the route due to real estate 
profit motives 
The BDOT procurement model in which subway 
development and real estate development were combined and 
  
 
where the Hangzhou government could intervene at any time 
to secure its income from real estate development made 
regular adjustments in the route line 1 a key phenomenon to 
understand the outcome of the events. All along the way, the 
Hangzhou government has promoted this innovative 
procurement model and failed to see possible downsides. As a 
result, the itinerary underwent countless changes. 
 
 
Figure 3 Changes in the route of subway line 1 from 2002 to 2007 
 
In figure 3, we can see how the original line 1 underwent 
three major changes (apart from countless small ones not 
mentioned here) in the period 2002 to 2007 [21]-[24]. In this 
process, universal access and reduction of traffic congestion 
(connecting densely populated areas) increasingly gave way 
to urban expansion and commercial development of 
residential areas and shopping malls. Xianghu, the location of 
the later subway station and accident can be found between the 
Binjiang and Xiaoshan areas and is famous for its beautiful 
hilly landscape and its lake and was therefore considered an 
excellent location to develop real estate. But the geological 
conditions there are far less propitious for subway 
construction than elsewhere, and the risk of accidents 
accordingly higher (apart from the fact that the line will no 
longer serve the Chengxiang area in Xiaoshan district, where 
it could have helped solving traffic problems). Moreover, 
sudden changes increased the likelihood of irresponsibly high 
work pressure imposed on the contractor and subcontractors. 
In March 2004, the opportunistic and profit-driven changes in 
the planning scheme were subject to strong citizen protest. In 
the end, in order to alleviate public anger, the Hangzhou City 
government promised to build another subway line (line 2) 
which would call at the center of Xiaoshan district to 
accommodate the traffic demand there. This was less easy 
than it seems at first sight, because it implied that the route for 
line 2 would almost certainly also be subjected to adjustments 
too. 
Another notable thing is that the continuous revisions in the 
route until January 2007 inevitably had a negative impact on 
the work of detailed construction design which began in 
September 2006 (see Figure 2). 
C. Permanent time compression to save money 
Time compression can be seen as an implicit way to save 
money at the expense of caution. Since subway line 1 is set up 
as a BDOT/SPV + TOT, the sooner the construction process 
is accomplished, the sooner the Hangzhou City government 
can get its cash back by leasing out the developed real estate. 
Furthermore, the contractor pays the salaries of workers by 
counting their working days. So to accelerate the construction 
the number of work hours per day can be increased while 
leaving the wages unchanged. Given the fact there is a 
growing demand for infrastructure construction in China, the 
sooner contractors can finish a project, the sooner they can 
begin the next one. 
In the case of the Xianghu station, the winning bid 
mentioned a completion of the construction time in September 
2009. However, in the official request for approval submitted 
to the State Council, completion had been forecasted for 
October 2010, which followed the official industry standards 
required for approval by the central government. Apparently, 
the actual construction schedule had been tightened by 13 
months compared to what was legally required. Worse even, 
the actual construction began in April 2008 rather than 
September 2007, as there had been a 6-month backlog 
because of delays in the demolition works [25]. To make up 
for this 19-month gap (see figure 8), laborers indeed had to 
work 16 hours or more per day and many safety regulations 
were violated [26], [27]. 
Due to the enormous time pressure effective tracking and 
monitoring of the effects of environmental variations at the 
site were neglected, such as the influence of rainfall and the 
dynamics resulting in variations in the load on the roof due to 
passing automobiles, as well as regulations regarding the 
excavation width and exposure time for materials and the 
order in which construction layers had to be laid before 
workers could move on to the next section [28]. 
D. The opaque phenomenon called sub-contracting 
Accordint to the bidding requirements [24] released by the 
Hangzhou Subway group, it is evident that these requirements 
are extremely high for general construction firms, leading to a 
situation where only the largest companies can obtain 
contracts, provided their relations („guanxi‟) with the client 
are good and they accept the fact that their bids should be very 
low to stand a chance in the competition. For this reason, the 
contractor is often willing to accept certain jobs at a loss to 
maintain a good relationship with their client. The smaller 
ones, on the other hand, are weak and often strapped for cash, 
and have little or no chance to become the (main) contractor In 
practice, the contractor winning the bid charges 5% 
management fees and then passes on the actual work to small 
private firms that do the actual physical construction work 
  
 
which they need in order to survive. Their weak position puts 
them in a subservient role and they are far removed from any 
opportunities to communicate directly with the client. The 
combination of factors is a dangerous admixture of high risk 
delegations without checks and balances: the lowest bids are 
the winning ones, leading to high financial and time pressures 
and evasion of regulatory safeguards against accidents, while 
these pressures are shifted to a great variety of nearly invisible, 
badly qualified (and sometimes illegal) subcontractors and 
sub-subcontractors acting on behalf of the main contractor 
[27], [29], [30]. These subcontractors are not independently 
monitored and have no incentive to send bad news or warning 
down. 
In the case of Xianghu station, the bid winner was the large 
China Railway Group Ltd. (CRG) which was mentioned 
before. Its first subcontractor was China Railway No.4 
Engineering Group Co., Ltd (CREG4), one of CRG‟s 47 
subsidiaries (CRG has most shares). At its turn, CREG4 has 
13 branch companies and 19 subsidiary companies and it used 
the Sixth Civil Engineering Co. Ltd. of the CTCE Group 
(CE6-CTCE), one of these 19 subsidiaries, as a 
sub-subcontractor. However, the actual builder of the fatal 
section of Xianghu station was the „Project Department of 
Hangzhou subway line 1‟, a sub-sub-subcontractor 
temporarily founded by CE6-CTCE. As we can see, 
transparency and effective project oversight are not easy in 
such circumstances, making it not completely unlikely that 
safety problems arise and remain undetected for a long time. 
E. The invisible but pernicious process of trading off 
public values 
In the above subsections, we have given quite of a bit of 
evidence on how the trading off process among various values 
between client and contractor, and between contractor and 
subcontractor evolves in the case of the Hangzhou subway 
line 1. The figure below succinctly summarizes these findings. 
The client (Hangzhou City government) formulated certain 
quality requirements (regarding safety and durability of the 
construction, partly in compliance with official regulations) 
and otherwise focused primarily on minimizing costs and time, 
while maximizing scope, such as maximizing income from 
real estate and servicing various areas or responding to 
pressure from pressure groups, the public and other players. 
The contractor (CRG) attempted to maximize its profits and 
goodwill with the client through accommodating the changes 
in scope (at least in appearance) while minimizing time and 
costs and maximizing extra income from real estate 
development. For CRG, quality was obviously a cost and 
therefore not very attractive to safeguard. In order to achieve 
all of this, it was deemed acceptable even to by-pass national 
legal procedures, requirements and safeguards aimed to 
promote caution. 
Fortunately for Hangzhou and CRG, there was a way to 
dissimulate these quality flaws. They were re-delegated to 
obedient and deprived subcontractors and sub-subcontractors 
whose time-pressured operations were not seriously 
monitored and which could (be trusted to) deliver what they 
promised. Because of the weak positions these unknown and 
sometimes ephemeral subcontractors had and the fact that 
CRG owned a majority of their shares, it could over-demand, 
push subcontractors against the wall and thus please its client 
by promising golden pie in the sky. However, there was a 
price to pay. Although often such half-legal and illegal 
practices of strategic behavior [31] and safety risks remain 
undetected and client and contractor get away with them, 
every now and then serious accidents occur casting a doubtful 
light on the contractual arrangements in place for some 
subway projects. Although the Hangzhou case seems 
exceptional in terms of the severity with which safety aspects 
were sacrificed for private economic gain and political 
convenience, the incentives for downplaying soft values when 
they do not appear to generate income need special 
consideration. This is true not only when they are not 
protected through legislation, but even when such regulations 
exist but are not (sufficiently) enforced. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the Hangzhou subway case has shown how 
institutional practices may create conditions for strategic 
behaviour, resulting in safety being traded off against „hard‟ 
values like time and money, thus generating conditions for 
direct causes for failure to occur. Unfortunately the Hangzhou 
case is hardly unique as far as safety outcomes are concerned, 
and neither is it in terms of the institutional practices identified: 
continuous revisions by the client, time compression, playing 
the „real estate card‟ and subcontracting. As such, the 
conditions underlying the occurrence of incidents and 
casualties are deeper and more persistent than merely 
technical failures, and widely spread over the country. 
Attempts at improving the safety performance therefore 
require measures at the institutional and regulatory level, not 
all of which can be immediately realized. 
More specifically, the analysis of the Hangzhou casus 
provides us with the following adaptations of institutional 
practices to enhance checks and balances in the Chinese 
context of subway construction. 
1) Real estate interests should be prevented from 
dominating the decision making. The Hangzhou case 
illustrates that if the client has immediate financial stakes 
in real estate development, this is a perverse incentive, 
which may result in risky trade-offs. On the other hand 
establishing a fire wall between subway construction and 
real estate development diminishes the opportunities to 
use the latter as a source of income [32]. Therefore the 
challenge regarding the playing of the real estate card is 
how the relationship between both activities can be 
arranged adequately. One solution might be to establish 
the infrastructure route before real estate is developed. 
Another is to prevent capture of government by real estate 
developers as happened in the Hangzhou case, by making 
  
 
real estate development part of the project scope, as is 
being done in what can be called the „Shenzhen model‟. 
In Shenzhen a public-private arrangement was used, 
requiring the contractor to co-finance the subway 
construction by reinvesting the profits of real estate 
development. Nevertheless this model is not without 
problems either: in one of the Shenzhen projects 
contractors delayed their investment in the subway once 
the real estate had been realized [33]. 
2) The client‟s interference with the professional planning 
of construction projects should be restricted. Ongoing 
revisions of the project will jeopardize its realization and 
create risks for failure, including safety risks. In this 
respect the procurement model used may be considered 
less fortunate, giving the Hangzhou government the 
opportunity to keep on interfering in the planning 
process. Worldwide BOT and DBFO contracts are 
renowned for their ability to reduce the number of scope 
changes by government during the realization phase [7], 
[34]. As long as the client bears the financial risks, it will 
hard to limit the client‟s strategic attempts to increase its 
gains by interfering in the planning and realization phase. 
In addition, the Hangzhou government‟s autonomy in 
making decisions on the project, despite the fact that 
financial responsibilities are distributed over various 
parties, might be seen as a cause of the whimsical 
behavior of the Hangzhou government. A greater 
accountability of the Hangzhou governments towards the 
district governments and banks might mitigate its 
inclination to intervene. 
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